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Abstract—In a typical face recognition pipeline, the task of
the face detector is to localize the face region. However, the face
detector localizes regions that look like a face, irrespective of the
liveliness of the face, which makes the entire system susceptible
to presentation attacks. In this work, we try to reformulate the
task of the face detector to detect real faces, thus eliminating
the threat of presentation attacks. While this task could be
challenging with visible spectrum images alone, we leverage the
multi-channel information available from off the shelf devices
(such as color, depth, and infrared channels) to design a multi-
channel face detector. The proposed system can be used as a
live-face detector obviating the need for a separate presentation
attack detection module, making the system reliable in practice
without any additional computational overhead. The main idea
is to leverage a single-stage object detection framework, with
a joint representation obtained from different channels for the
PAD task. We have evaluated our approach in the multi-channel
WMCA dataset containing a wide variety of attacks to show the
effectiveness of the proposed framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
Face recognition technology has become ubiquitous these
days, thanks to the advance in deep learning based methods
[1]. However, the reliability of face recognition systems (FRS)
in the presence of attacks is poor in practical situations, mainly
due to the vulnerability against presentation attacks (a.k.a
spoofing attacks) [2], [3]. Presenting artifacts like a photograph
or video in front of the camera could be enough to fool
unprotected FR systems. The artifact used for this attack is
known as a presentation attack instrument (PAI).
Presentation attack detection (PAD) tries to protect the FR
systems against such attacks. Majority of the PAD meth-
ods proposed in the literature focuses on the detection of
2D attacks. Most of these methods use either feature-based
methods or CNN based approaches using visible spectrum
images. However, they do not emulate a realistic scenario of
encountering realistic 3D attacks. Recently, there has been a
lot of works focusing on the detection of a wide variety of
attacks, including 2D, 3D, and partial attacks. Multi-channel
methods have been proposed as a possible alternative to deal
with real-world scenarios with a wide variety of attacks [4],
[5]. Usage of multiple channels makes it harder to fool the
PAD systems.
For reliable usage of face recognition systems, they must
be equipped with a presentation attack detection module. The
Fig. 1. Schematic of the proposed framework. The camera captures images in
color, depth and infrared channels (all channel coming from a single commer-
cially available device) and the RetinaNet based multi channel face detector
performs simultaneous face detection and presentation attack detection using
the composite image from these channels.
PAD module can act before, after, or together with the face
recognition module.
Typically face recognition frameworks consists of a prepro-
cessing stage including face detection and alignment, followed
by the actual face recognition task. In the proposed PAD
framework, we propose to use a multi-channel face detector
as the PAD system. In this way, the preprocessing stage for
the face recognition system itself can perform PAD, thanks to
the multi-channel information. Furthermore, the face detectors
used typically are also CNN based, so if we can replace
this face detector with the proposed module, it should not
increase the overall complexity while adding PAD capabilities,
simplifying the overall face recognition pipeline by removing
the redundancy.
Presentation attack detection is achieved by changing the
task of the face detector from detecting faces to detecting
bonafide faces. This is a hard challenge when only RGB
channels are used and can result in a lot of detection errors.
However, the proposed face detection based PAD framework
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2(Fig. 1) leverage the multi-channel information to discriminate
between bonafide and presentation attacks.
Another advantage of the proposed face detection-based
framework is the efficient use of the background. Most of
the common PAD frameworks utilize only the facial region
and completely ignores the information from the background.
Notably, in a multi-channel framework, background could
give beneficial negative samples to make the system robust.
The proposed framework can be configured based on the
availability of data in different ways. It can be trained as
a purely one class model when no negative samples are
available, i.e, when only bonafide samples are available. The
bonafide face location can be used as positive samples, and
the entire background can be used as negative samples. When
attacks are available, the face detector can be trained to classify
between bonafide and the attack classes. It is also possible
to train the face detector as a multi-class classifier when we
have the labels for different kinds of attack classes. While
training the face detector, a lot of negative samples contribute
to the loss function. To avoid this, we use the focal loss
formulation, which focuses on the hard examples. If the face
detection network is trained only on bonafide samples, most
of the negative samples (patches) would be easy to classify.
The attack class images can be used as hard negative samples.
This introduces greater flexibility as the face detector can be
trained with different configurations, for instance, as a one-
class classifier, either with only bonafide class, or with the
addition of attack classes too in training providing the CNN
based face detector with harder examples, or as multi class
classifier. This could be useful in the cases where only a
limited amount of attacks are available in training.
To the best knowledge of the authors, this is the first
work using a multi-channel face detector for the task of face
presentation attack detection. The main contributions of this
work are listed below.
• Proposes a novel framework for PAD, using a multi-
channel face detector, performing simultaneous face lo-
calization and presentation attack detection.
• The channels used in this work comes from an affordable
consumer-grade camera, which makes it easy to deploy
this system in real-world conditions.
• The proposed algorithm can be used as a preprocessing
stage in face recognition systems, thus reducing the
redundancy of an additional PAD system in the face
recognition pipeline.
II. RELATED WORK
Most of the prevailing literature in face presentation attack
detection deals with the detection of 2D attacks using visible
spectrum images. Majority of them depend on the quality
degradation of the recaptured samples for PAD. Methods
such as motion patterns [6], Local Binary Patterns (LBP)
[7], image quality features [8], and image distortion analysis
[9] are examples of feature based PAD methods. Also, there
are several CNN based methods achieving state of the art
performance [10]–[12]. While there has been a lot of work in
the detection of 2D presentation attacks, the assumptions of
quality degradation during recapture does not hold for attacks
such as realistic silicone masks and partial attacks. Here we
limit the discussion to recent and representative methods that
handle a wide variety of 2D and 3D attacks.
With the ever-improving quality of attacks, visible spectrum
images alone may not suffice for detecting presentation at-
tacks. This problem becomes more severe when there is a wide
variety of possible 2D and 3D presentation attacks possible.
Multi-channel and multi-spectral methods have been proposed
as a solution for this problem [13], [14].
Raghavendra et al. [13] presented an approach to use
complementary information from different channels using a
multi-spectral PAD framework. Their method used a fusion
of wavelet-based features. Score level fusion achieved better
performance as compared to feature fusion in detecting attacks
prepared using different kinds of printers. Erdogmus and
Marcel [15] showed that 3D masks could fool the PAD systems
easily. By combining the LBP features from color and depth
channels, they could achieve good performance in the 3DMAD
dataset.
Steiner et al. [14] introduced multi-spectral SWIR image-
based PAD method, capturing four different wavelengths -
935nm, 1060nm, 1300nm and 1550nm. Their method essen-
tially consisted of a skin level classifier in a predefined Region
Of Interest (ROI) where the skin was expected to be present.
They trained a pixel-level SVM to classify each pixel as skin
or not. The percentage of skin detections in the ROI was used
as the PAD score. Their method achieved 99.28% accuracy in
pixel-level skin classification.
In [16], the authors combined visible and thermal image
patches for PAD. The patches used for the subsequent face
recognition stage were selected by first classifying the patches
as either bonafide or attacks.
Bhattacharjee et al. [17] showed the vulnerability of CNN
based face recognition systems against 3D masks. They also
proposed simple thermal-based features for PAD. Further, in
[18], they presented preliminary experiments on the use of
additional channels for PAD.
In [4], George et al. presented a multi-channel face presen-
tation attack detection framework. Their approach consisted
of extending a pretrained face recognition network to accept
multiple channels and to adapt a minimal number of layers
to prevent overfitting. The proposed method achieved an error
rate of 0.3 % in the challenging WMCA dataset using color,
depth, infrared and thermal channels.
Many multi-channel datasets have been made available for
PAD recently. However, the variety of attacks is rather limited
in most of the available databases.
Typical PAD frameworks perform a preprocessing stage
involving face detection with RGB channel, followed by align-
ment and binary classification for PAD. The PAD classifier, for
most of them, has the form of a binary classifier acting on the
detected face regions which might result in poor performance
in unseen attack scenarios. Such frameworks ignores the useful
information coming from the background regions completely.
Moreover, the PAD module adds additional complexity to the
face recognition pipeline.
3III. PROPOSED APPROACH
In the proposed approach, we use an object detection frame-
work for localizing face and classifying between bonafide
and non-face (attacks) labels. Specifically, we formulate the
problem of multi-channel presentation attack detection as a
two-class object detection problem. We leverage a single-stage
object detection framework for this purpose. The task for the
proposed object detector is to detect the presence of ‘bonafide’
or ‘non-face’ classes. While training, face locations detected
by the RGB face detector [19] is used as the ground truth
bounding box locations. The class labels of the bounding boxes
is considered as ‘bonafide’ class for real samples and all other
attack classes are grouped as ‘non-face’ class. In the evaluation
phase, the confidence of the bonafide class is used for the
scoring. If no object classes (‘bonafide’ or ‘non-face’) are
detected, then the sample is considered as an attack which
was not seen in training. We use the RetinaNet [20] as the
base architecture for the proposed multi-channel face detector,
which obtained state of the art performance in object detection
tasks.
A. Preprocessing
The data used in the network comprises of color, depth,
and infrared channels. The color channel is converted to
gray-scale. The raw depth and infrared channels available
from the hardware are in 16-bit format. We first normalize
these channels with Median Absolute Deviation (MAD) based
normalization to convert them to 8 bit [5].
This stage is detailed as follows, let I be the image; first,
a vector v containing non-zero elements of I is obtained to
reduce the effect of background holes and dead pixels. The
MAD value is computed as follows,
MAD = median(|v −median(v)|) (1)
Once the MAD is computed, the image can be normalized to
8 bit as:
Iˆi,j =
(Ii,j −median(v) + σ ·MAD)
2 · σ ·MAD · (2
8 − 1), (2)
Values i and j denote the coordinates of the pixels in the
image. The σ value used in our experiments was four.
Once all the channels are available in 8-bit format, they are
concatenated to form the grayscale-depth-infrared composite
image, which is used as the input in the subsequent CNN
pipeline. An example of the composite bonafide image is
shown in Fig. 2
B. Network architecture and loss function
The objective is to treat PAD problem as an object detection
problem. In literature, there are several two-stage detectors
that can do object detection by first generating the candidate
locations and then classifying the candidate locations to get
object labels. However, one stage object detectors are advan-
tageous due to their simple design and faster inference. The
RetinaNet [20] architecture is a one-stage object detection
architecture, which is simpler and quicker at the inference
stage. One of the main issues with one stage detectors is the
Fig. 2. The composite image is formed from gray-scale, depth and infrared
channels by stacking the normalized images.
poor performance due to heavy class imbalance. Out of a large
number of candidate locations, only a few of them contain
objects. This could result in poor models as the loss includes
a lot of contributions from the background. In RetinaNet [20],
this issue is handled by introducing a new loss function called
focal loss. This is done by down-weighting easy examples so
that their contribution is less in the loss function. In summary,
focal loss naturally favors the training on hard instances.
1) Architecture: We use the standard RetinaNet architecture
built from a backbone network as the object detector. In our
implementation, we used Feature Pyramid Network [21] with
ResNet-18 [22] backbone. There are two subnetworks; one is
tasked with regressing the bounding box and the other one is
performing the classification. In our case, the classifier needs
to classify the presence of ‘bonafide’ or ‘non-face’ categories.
The task of the regression network is to predict the ‘bonafide’
(or ‘non-face’ ) bounding box. Instead of RGB images, we
use the composite image created in the preprocessing stage as
the input to the network.
2) Loss function: As shown earlier, the RetinaNet architec-
ture consists of two subnetworks, one for landmark regression
and one for classification. For the object classification, the
typically used cross entropy loss (CE) has the following form:
CE(p, y) =
{
− log(p) if y = 1
− log(1− p) otherwise. (3)
In the above equation, y ∈ {±1} specifies the label, p ∈
[0, 1] is probability computed by the network for the class with
label y = 1. We define pt as:
pt =
{
p if y = 1
1− p otherwise, (4)
so that we can rewrite the loss as CE(p, y) = CE(pt) =
− log(pt).
After adding the modulation factor (1−pt)γ , and α-balancing
the expression for focal loss (FL) becomes [20]:
FL(pt) = −αt(1− pt)γ log(pt). (5)
The classification head of the network is trained with this
loss function which reduces the effect of easily classifiable
background patches in the loss function.
43) Scoring method: The network described above is trained
as an object detector to localize and classify face. Here the
notation ‘face’ denotes the location of face irrespective of
the class label. The possible classes are ‘bonafide’ and ‘non-
face’. The ‘non-face’ category might contain a wide variety
of attacks, and its possible that in some cases, no objects are
detected. However, for the PAD system, we need to get a
score, which is defined as the probability of a bonafide class.
The network outputs a classification label and class probability
for the detected class, above a detection threshold. Once this
information is available, the scoring is performed as follows.
If the object class predicted is ‘bonafide’ then PAD score
is computed as score = Pbonafide where Pbonafide is the
probability of ‘bonafide’ class. If the object class returned is
‘non-face’ then score = 1 − Pnon−face where Pnon−face is
the probability of the ‘non-face’ class. In the case where no
objects are detected, as the case when an unseen attack is
present, the sample is considered as an attack and given a
predefined low score (i.e., considered as an attack).
4) Implementation details: We used a standard RetinaNet
architecture with ResNet-18 [22] backbone for our experi-
ments. Pretrained weights of a model trained on ImageNet
[23] was used to initialize the ResNet blocks. To train the
face detector, train set of the PAD database was used for
training, and the dev set was used for validation. The model
was trained as a standard object detector with two classes
(‘bonafide’ and ‘non-face’ classes). The face bounding box
used in the training was obtained from MTCNN algorithm
[19] on color channel images. Adam Optimizer [24] with a
learning rate of 2× 10−5 was used in the training. The model
was trained for 50 epochs with ten frames from each video on
a GPU grid. All the layers were adapted during the network
training. The model corresponding to minimum validation loss
was selected for the evaluation. The implementation was done
with PyTorch [25].
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
A. Databases used
The key requirement of the proposed framework is the use
of ‘multi-channel’ information. We have conducted experi-
ments in the publicly available Wide Multi-Channel presen-
tation Attack (WMCA) [4] database, which contains a wide
variety of 2D and 3D presentation attacks. To the best of
our knowledge, there are no other publically available PAD
datasets that contain synchronized multi-channel data in a us-
able format for our task. One other notable multi-channel PAD
dataset is CASIA-SURF [26]. However, they only provide
cropped and preprocessed images in the public distribution
which cannot be used in an object detector framework. The
WMCA dataset contains a total of 1679 video samples from
72 individuals. Mainly, the database contains four different
channels of information recorded simultaneously, namely,
color, depth, infrared, and thermal channels, collected using
two consumer-grade devices, Intel R© RealSenseTMSR300 (for
color, depth and infrared), and Seek Thermal CompactPRO
(for the thermal channel). The database contains different types
of 2D and 3D attacks, such as print, replay, funny eyeglasses,
Fig. 3. Attack categories in WMCA, (image taken from [4]) dataset (Color
channel), (a): glasses (paper glasses), (b): glasses (funny eyes), (c): print (2D),
(d): replay (2D), (e): fake head, (f): rigid mask (Obama mask), (g): rigid mask
(transparent plastic mask), (h): rigid mask (custom made), (i): flexible mask
(custom made), and (j): paper mask.
fake head, rigid mask, flexible silicone mask, and paper masks.
The statistics of attack types is shown in Table I. More details
of the database can be found in [4]. Even though four different
channels are available in the database, we use only three
channels coming from the consumer-grade Intel RealSense
camera (color, depth, and infrared). This makes the practical
deployment more feasible as compared to the method in [4].
The samples of RGB images for the attack categories are
shown in Fig. 3
TABLE I
NUMBER OF SAMPLES IN EACH PRESENTATION ATTACK CATEGORY IN
WMCA DATABASE.
Attack Type Category #Videos
Bonafide - 347
Print 2D 200
Replay 2D 348
Fake head 3D 122
Rigid mask 3D 137
Flexible mask 3D 379
Paper mask 3D 71
Glasses 3D (Partial) 75
TOTAL 1679
B. Protocols
We use the same grandtest protocol defined in [4] for our
experiments. However, it is to be noted that we only use three
channels out of the four channels available from the database.
All the channels we used are coming from the same consumer
grade device making it suitable for deployment.
C. Metrics
For the evaluation of the algorithms, we have used the
ISO/IEC 30107-3 metrics [3], Attack Presentation Classifica-
5tion Error Rate (APCER), and Bonafide Presentation Classi-
fication Error Rate (BPCER) along with the Average Clas-
sification Error Rate (ACER) in the eval set. We compute
the threshold in the dev set for a BPCER value of 0.2%.
EPC curves and APCER and BPCER are also calculated.
Additionally, the APCER of individual attack types and the
ACER-AP which is defined as the average of BPCER and the
maximum APCER of the attack types are also reported.
D. Baseline methods
We have implemented feature-based and CNN based base-
lines to compare with the proposed method. We used the same
channels, i.e., gray-scale, depth, and infrared channels in most
of the baselines for a fair comparison (except for the use of
color channel in some baselines). We compared the proposed
approach with competing multi-channel baselines using the
same channels. The description of the baseline methods is
given below.
• Haralick Fusion: Here we use an extension of RDWT-
Haralick-SVM method in [27]. First, we perform a pre-
processing stage, which consists of face detection. After
that, the face region in all channels are normalized to the
size of 128 × 128 pixels and rotated to make the eye-
line horizontal. For each channel, Haralick [28] features
computed from 4 × 4 grid are concatenated to form the
feature vector. This feature vector was used with logistic
regression (LR) for individual channels for the PAD task.
A score fusion of all the channels was performed to get
the final PAD score.
• IQM-LBP fusion: In this baseline, we followed a similar
preprocessing as the previous baseline. After the prepro-
cessing stage, features are extracted from different chan-
nels, for example, Image Quality Measures (IQM) [8]
were extracted for the RGB channel, and variants of Local
Binary Patterns (LBP) features for non-RGB channels.
For each channel, a logistic regression model is trained,
and score level fusion is performed to obtain the PAD
scores.
• FASNet (Color): This is an RGB only CNN [29] baseline
for the PAD task. Similar to the other baselines, this net-
work also utilizes aligned images from the preprocessing
stage.
• MCCNN-GDI: Here we implemented [4], which achieved
state of the art performance in the grandtest protocol
in WMCA dataset, when used with gray-scale, depth,
infrared and thermal channels. Here, to make it compa-
rable with that of the proposed system, we retrained the
system with the channels used in this work, i.e., gray-
scale, depth, and infrared channels.
Additionally, for the feature-based methods, the best per-
forming method from each channel is also added in the
evaluations.
E. Experiments
1) Baseline results: The results of different baselines sys-
tems with color, depth, and infrared channels, as well as the
fusion methods, are shown in Table II. For the individual
channels, only the result from the best one is reported. Of
all the channels present, the infrared channel performs the
best with an ACER of 11.0%. Though fusion improves the
overall ROC, the performance in low BPCER regions becomes
slightly worse. Out of the baselines, the MCCNN-GDI method
is clearly superior, achieving an ACER of 3%.
2) Results with the proposed framework: From Table II,
it can be seen that the proposed face detection based PAD
framework achieves an ACER of 1.5% outperforming the state
of the art baselines. Some of the successful detections are
shown in Fig. 4.
To identify the limitations of the framework, some of the
false detections are also shown in Fig. 5. The instances of
bonafide getting classified as the attack could be due to the
missing values in the depth channel. Depth data from the
device contains holes where depth is not estimated correctly.
This can probably be avoided with a preprocessing stage with
hole filling and smoothing of the depth channel.
The same could explain the misclassification of the trans-
parent mask as bonafide. Some of the attacks with paper
glasses are misclassified since it looks identical to bonafide
with corrective glasses.
Fig. 4. Image showing the successful detections, green boxes indicate
the bonafide detections and red boxes denote attack detections. First row
shows the successful bonafide detections and second row shows the successful
presentation attack detections.
3) Detailed analysis of the scores: In this section, we
perform a detailed analysis of the scores to get insights
into the misdetections and failure cases. For this analysis,
we compute the decision threshold in the development set
with BPCER 0.2% criterion, and we apply this threshold on
the evaluation set. After that, we aggregate the APCER for
individual attack categories. The results for different attack
categories are tabulated in Table III.
From the Table III, it can be seen that the proposed method
achieves perfect performance in 2D attack classification. This
is expected since the information from the depth channel
alone might suffice for this task. The performance in 3D
masks are also satisfactory, considering the very low BPCER
values. The glasses attacks are the most challenging ones, and
6TABLE II
PERFORMANCE OF THE BASELINE SYSTEMS AND THE COMPONENTS IN GRANDTEST PROTOCOL OF WMCA DATASET. THE VALUES REPORTED ARE
OBTAINED WITH A THRESHOLD COMPUTED FOR BPCER 0.2% IN dev SET.
Method dev (%) test (%)
APCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
Color (Haralick-LR) 41.1 20.6 42.0 1.0 21.5
Depth (Haralick-LR) 42.2 21.2 50.6 0.2 25.4
Infrared (Haralick-LR) 24.9 12.5 21.9 0.0 11.0
Haralick Fusion 29.0 14.6 27.0 0.3 13.6
IQM-LBP fusion 41.9 21.0 47.7 0.3 24.0
FASNet (Color) 29.3 14.7 24.9 3.8 14.3
MCCNN-GDI 2.3 1.2 6.1 0.0 3.0
Proposed 1.2 0.7 1.9 1.0 1.5
Fig. 5. Image showing the failure case in detections, green boxes indicate
the bonafide detections and red boxes denote attack detections. The first row
shows the failure cases where bonafide are classified as attacks and the second
row shows the failure cases where attacks are misclassified as bonafide.
TABLE III
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE PERFORMANCE FOR DIFFERENT PA’S, AT
THRESHOLD COMPUTED FOR BPCER 0.2% IN dev SET.
Attack Type Category Dev Set Eval Set
Prints 2D 0.0% 0.0%
Replay 2D 0.0% 0.0%
Flexible mask 3D 2.0% 0.8%
Rigid mask 3D 3.7% 3.2%
Fake head 3D 0.0% 0.4%
Glasses 3D (Partial) 2.5% 11.9%
APCER-AP 3.7% 11.9%
BPCER 0.2% 1.0%
ACER-AP 1.9% 6.5%
they contribute to most of the misclassifications. The glasses
category consists of ‘Paper glass‘ (Fig. 3 (a)) and ‘Funny eyes‘
(Fig. 3 (b)) sub categories. Moreover, these are the only partial
attacks present in the database. Especially in the channels
considered, the funny eyes and the paper glass appear very
similar to bonafide samples with medical glass. This results in
misclassification of these attacks.
The ROC plots provide information about the performance
in the evaluation set only. However, in realistic conditions,
the decision threshold has to be set a priori. Expected per-
formance curves (EPC) [30] provide an unbiased estimate
of the performance of (two-class) classifiers. As opposed to
the ROC curve, where the evaluation is done only on the
test set, EPC combines both development and test group to
obtain the expected performance. The EPC curve shows the
performance changes as a trade-off between False Matching
Rate (FMR) and False Non Matching Rate (FNMR). This
trade-off is controlled by the parameter 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 as follows:
WER = α× (FMR) + (1− α)× (FNMR) (6)
where WER (weighted error rate) is computed as a weighted
combination of FMR and FNMR.
For each value of α, the score-threshold which minimize
the WER is selected based on the development group. The
threshold chosen is used to compute the Half Total Error Rate
(HTER) in the evaluation set.
Fig. 6 shows the EPC plots of the proposed approach and
the baseline methods. From the EPC curves, it can be seen
that, in the lower BPCER regions (α ≤ 0.5), the proposed
approach outperforms the state of the art methods, indicating
the robustness of the approach.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
α
0
10
20
30
40
50
HT
ER
 (%
)
EPC
IQM-LBP-Fusion
Haralick-Fusion
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Fig. 6. EPC plots for the reproducible baselines and proposed method in the
eval set of grandtest protocol in WMCA dataset
F. Discussions
From the experimental results, it can be seen that the pro-
posed framework for PAD with multi-channel data works bet-
ter than binary classifier based approaches in the low BPCER
range. This framework is ideal for typical usage settings since
7face detection is a part of the face recognition pipeline. Instead
of using conventional face detection methods which detect and
pass both bonafide and attacks to the subsequent stages, the
proposed method uses a multi-channel face detector, specif-
ically trained to localize and distinguish bonafide and attack
(’non-face’) classes simultaneously. Also, it is worth noting
that the hardware used in the proposed pipeline is a single
off-the-shelf Intel RealSense SR300 camera. To sum it up, the
proposed approach provides face PAD as a face detector itself.
Currently, the multi channel presentation attack databases
available are collected in controlled conditions. Availability of
data collected ‘in the wild’ conditions could make it possible
to train the face detector using just the bonafide samples.
The harder negatives from the background might improve the
performance of the detector greatly.
V. CONCLUSIONS
the proposed method shows a simple yet efficient method for
PAD using multi-channel information. The method does not
add additional complexity to a face recognition pipeline since
it can be a drop-in replacement for the face detector in the
preprocessing stage. Even though the method is multichannel,
the channels used are readily available from cheap consumer
devices which makes it feasible for deployment.
Addition of a PAD module is essential to secure face
recognition systems against spoofing attempts. Typical PAD
modules adds another layer of computational complexity to the
face recognition pipeline. In this work, we propose a simple
yet effective solution to add PAD capabilities to a face recogni-
tion system without adding any additional computational com-
plexity. This is done by swapping the face detector in typical
FR pipelines with the proposed multichannel face detector.
The (multi-channel) face detector is used as a presentation
attack detector, thereby reducing the redundancy in the face
recognition pipeline. To our best knowledge, this is the first
method to use multi-channel face detection as a PAD system.
Specifically, a multi-channel face detector is trained to localize
and classify bonafide faces and presentation attacks. The
proposed method utilizes color, depth, and infrared channels
available from a commercially available sensors for PAD. The
proposed method was compared with feature-based methods
and state of the art CNN based methods for comparison in the
WMCA dataset and was found to outperform the state of the
art method while obviating the requirement of additional face
detection stage.
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